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Labour Market Mismatch Among UK Graduates; 
An Analysis Using REFLEX Data 
 
1. Introduction 
There is considerable controversy over the extent to which graduates are mismatched 
or not in the labour market. Studies using measures of overeducation generally find, 
on the basis of subjective responses to survey questions directed at employees, that a 
substantial proportion of graduates are employed in jobs for which a degree is not 
required. Thus, Green and Zhu (2008), using UK Skills Surveys data show that 
overqualification among graduates rose from 21.2% in 1992 to 33.2% in 2006. Battu, 
Belfield and Sloane (1999)  and Dolton and Vignoles (2000), among others,  show 
that overqualified graduates have lower earnings compared to others with the same 
qualifications, but who are properly matched, though their earnings are higher than 
those of their matched co-workers. Overqualified workers also report lower job 
satisfaction than properly matched workers. However, interpretation of such results 
derived from subjective employee responses to survey questions is not 
straightforward. Certain jobs may specify a minimum educational requirement and if 
this is below degree level a graduate may well give a response which indicates he or 
she is overeducated, though a degree may be the preferred qualification for the job, 
given sufficient applicants. A further possibility is that educational requirements for 
particular jobs are rising over time, so that a degree may not have been required when 
a graduate obtained the job, though it is currently required. Without appropriate 
questions this may not be picked up. A further problem is that an individual may be 
overqualified because of low ability for that level of qualification. This may well be 
consistent with the efficient functioning of the labour market rather than indicating a 
form of market failure. An alternative interpretation is that certain individuals may 
have chosen non graduate employment because it offers compensating advantages 
such as a preferred location or less stressful work. Further, alternative definitions of 
graduate jobs can produce results which conflict with those in the literature above. 
Thus, Gottschalk and Hansen (2003), defined a graduate job in terms of whether the 
proportion of graduates in an occupation exceeded 90% or, failing that, graduates in 
that occupation obtained a significant pay premium of at least 10% over non-
graduates. They found that the proportion of US graduates in non-graduate jobs was 
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actually declining over time, whereas the earlier overeducation literature had 
suggested the reverse. Using the same model Grazier, O’Leary and Sloane (2008) 
obtained a very similar result for the UK. Recent data sets have included questions 
which enable one to estimate the degree of overskilling and this may be a more 
appropriate variable for picking up variations in individual ability, since an individual 
who is overqualified, but not overskilled may be appropriately allocated to a 
particular occupation. 
In this paper we utilise the REFLEX survey in order to attempt to unravel some of 
the issues identified above. The paper should been seen as extending earlier work. 
Thus, Allen, Badillo-Amador and van der Velden (2006) used REFEX data from nine 
countries to show that educational and skill mismatches were rather weakly related. 
This was confirmed by Green and McIntosh (2007), using UK data. Chevalier (2003) 
distinguished between those who were in a non-graduate job but satisfied with it (the 
apparently overeducated) and those who were similarly matched but not satisfied with 
it (the genuinely overeducated). The wage penalty for being overeducated was much 
lower in the latter case. Chevalier and Lindley (2009) used a 1995 cohort of UK 
graduates, interviewed in 2002/3, based on four digit occupations to differentiate 
between graduate and non-graduate jobs. They found that the genuinely overeducated 
possessed significantly less management and leadership skills than those who were 
only apparently so. Green and Zhu (2008) distinguished between ‘real’ and ‘formal’ 
overqualification on the basis of whether the overqualification was accompanied by 
skill underutilisation or not, finding that pay penalties were substantially greater for 
the real overqualification group than for the formal one. 
Using REFLEX we are able to cast further light on these issues by focusing on the 
UK and making use of the richness of data on graduate employment, which 
distinguishes between first and current job, vertical and horizontal mismatch, 
over/underqualification and over/underskilling as well as a range of questions on the 
nature of work organisation and individual competencies. 
2. The Data 
The Flexible Professional in the Knowledge Society (REFLEX) project was financed 
as a Specific Targeted Research Project (STREP) of the European Union’s Sixth 
Framework Programme covering 15 countries. It is limited to graduates in the 
1999/2000 academic year, who were interviewed five years later in 2005. We focus 
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on UK graduates only for a number of reasons. First, this allows for a more direct 
comparison with some of the studies referred to above. Second, the UK is somewhat 
atypical in having the highest proportion of graduates in any of the countries in the 
survey failing to utilise their skills. Third, the UK sample consists mainly of those 
with a bachelors degree, while in many other countries the sample consists mainly or 
wholly of those with a masters degree. This means that the UK graduates tend to have 
spent less time in higher education and to be much younger on average at time of 
graduation than in the other countries (see Brennan (2008)).   
 
With respect to the data used here, we restrict our sample to those individuals 
currently employed who had studied on a full-time basis while at University.  As a 
result of these exclusions the effective sample falls from 1,578 to 1,123. Individuals 
were defined as overeducated if they indicated that a below tertiary level of education 
was most appropriate for the job. Conversely, they were deemed to be undereducated 
if the most appropriate level of education was below that actually acquired. 
Overskilling was based on the response to a question asking individuals to rate on a 1 
to 5 scale1 the extent to which their skills and knowledge were utilised in their work 
with a response of 1 or 2 deemed consistent with overskilling. Using the same scale, 
workers were deemed to be underskilled if they responded 4 or 5 to a question 
indicating that their job demanded more knowledge and skills than they could actually 
offer.  Summary statistics for the UK sample are provided in the appendix; however, 
some aspects of the data are worth noting at this point.  In the UK 36% felt they were 
overeducated in their initial job compared to 14% elsewhere in Europe and 20% felt 
that their particular field of study was directly required in their initial job, compared 
to 29% elsewhere. Further, 33% of UK graduates believed that their higher education 
skills had not been fully utilised in their initial job, compared to 17% elsewhere. 
However, when we turn to employment in current job the UK figures for both 
overeducation and overskilling fell to 14% compared to 7% and 10% elsewhere 
suggesting that some convergence had taken place. Thus, overall, it is clear that UK 
graduates still believe that they are less well prepared for employment than other 
graduates. However, it is unclear to what extent these differences reflect differences in 
the qualifications obtained and the age at which graduation takes place. 
                                                 
1 Where 1 was not at all and 5 to a very high extent. 
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3. Methodology 
 
In terms of the methodological approach adopted here, we make an assessment of the 
extent to which the alternative forms of mismatch are genuine by assessing their 
impacts on both wages and job satisfaction. Checks are also carried out to ensure that 
our estimates are not affected by biases relating to either sample selection or 
unobserved individual heterogeneity.  We then go on to exploit a unique aspect of the 
data to test for compensating differentials before attempting to make some assessment 
of the specific skill areas where overskilling may occur.  
 
First, we estimate a wage equation of the form 
 
ED SK
1 2 3 ilog w X D D= α +α +α + ε     [1] 
 
Where X  equals a vector of personal and structural characteristics, EDD  equals over 
and under-education dummies, SKD  equals over- and underskilling dummies and iε  is 
an iid error term. EDD  and SKD  are first entered separately and then jointly to 
determine the extent to which any negative wage effect is influenced by the presence 
of the other. These equations are run for the whole sample and separately by gender. 
We then adopt a propensity score matching (PSM) model with control and 
treatment groups to identify any unobserved heterogeneity bias, where the propensity 
score is defined as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given certain 
determining characteristics 
 
p(X) Pr{D 1/ X} E{D / X}= = =     [2] 
 
where D is a binary term indicating exposure to the treatment and X  is a vector of 
determining characteristics. On the grounds that both overeducation and overskilling 
may be associated with unobserved factors, such as lower ability, we exploit the data 
on first job to ensure that the control group will consist of individuals mismatched in 
first job but matched in current job. To the extent that either form of mismatch is 
associated with unobserved factors, these will be constant across the control and 
treatment groups ensuring the robustness of our estimates. Further sensitivity analysis 
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is then applied to our PSM estimates to ensure that they are free from the effects on 
individual unobserved heterogeneity bias. 
 
Next, we estimate a probit model of the effect of graduate overeducation or 
undereducation and graduate overskilling and underskilling on job satisfaction 
 
* ED SK
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 1iS X D D E= β +β +β +     [3] 
 
where iS  is a latent variable which denotes an individual’s probability of being 
satisfied at work based on responses to a job satisfaction question. Again the 
education and skill mismatch variables are initially inserted separately and then 
jointly. 
 
We then regress on mismatch variables on various job attributes to establish 
whether individuals are trading off higher earnings for other attributes of employment. 
 
ED SK
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 2iJA X D D= γ + γ + γ + ε     [4] 
 
Finally, we attempt to establish the relationship between the possession of 
particular skill competencies and both wages and job satisfaction equations including 
the skill competency variables. 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 reports the results from the wage regressions. We estimate four specifications. 
Specification 1 contains only standard controls, specification 2 includes overeducation 
and undereducation controls, and specification 3 contains overskilling and 
underskilling controls with the final specifications including all controls. Specification 
4 is then estimated separately for males and females.   Turning firstly to specification 
1, the model itself is well specified with all covariates behaving according to prior 
expectations. Males were found to earn a wage premium of nine percent, while 
faculty effects were limited with only education and agriculture / veterinary graduates 
earning significantly less than the base case2. The returns to a first class or two one 
                                                 
2 This consists of graduates from backgrounds such as Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction and 
Services. 
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degree were 14 and 8 per cent respectively, while respondents who obtained Masters 
degrees earned 13 per cent more than those who did not. Other variables of interest 
included a post-graduation unemployment spell, which reduced earnings by 12 per 
cent and public sector employment, which was associated with a 10 percent penalty. 
Earnings were found to rise with the number of hours worked, supervisory 
responsibilities and employment in a large firm. Having more than one employer 
since graduation tended to depress earnings, suggesting that frictional job search 
activity early in one’s career may be costly. The data also contain some interesting 
controls for horizontal mismatch and course content / prestige. With respect to 
horizontal mismatch, there was no consistent evidence to suggest that being in a job 
that was either fully or partially aligned with the subjects studied on the degree 
programme increased earnings in any way3.  In terms of course content / prestige, 
while vocationally orientated degrees or those well known to employers were 
associated with no wage premiums / penalties, respondents who had graduated from 
degree programmes that were considered prestigious earned 12 per cent more.  
 
When the overeducation and undereducation variables are added to the model 
(Specification 2), at almost 40 per cent, there was evidence of a large pay penalty to 
being overeducated in one’s current job. However, no wage effects were evident for 
overeducation in first job or undereducation in any job. Further, when specification 2 
was re-estimated without controls for current over / undereducation, a significant 
wage penalty of 13 per cent was found for overeducation in first job, confirming that 
previous and current overeducation are highly correlated. In specification 3, the pay 
penalty to being overskilled in current job was, at 22 per cent, almost half that of the 
comparable overeducation figure.  Workers who were underskilled in their current 
employment earned a 9 per cent premium relative to their matched counterparts, while 
there was no evidence of any wage effects related to skill mismatch during initial 
employment. The controls for skill mismatch in first job remained insignificant when 
the current mismatch variables were dropped from the model, suggesting a somewhat 
less persistent wage effect. When the model was estimated containing all mismatch 
controls (Specification 4) the pay penalties associated with overeducation and 
                                                 
3 The 11 per cent premium observed for full horizontal match in specification 1 became statistically 
insignificant in the more detailed specifications.  
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overskilling in current job fell to 34 and 10 per cent respectively, while the pay 
premium to underskilling in current job remained unchanged.  The magnitude of the 
adjustment in the overeducation and overskilling pay penalties is somewhat larger 
than those reported in other studies; however, this is most likely explained by the fact 
that the relationship between both subjective variables is much stronger than that 
reported in these earlier studies,4 suggesting the existence of important measurement 
differences.   
 
When the data were split according to gender the results showed that, while both 
sexes incurred large wage penalties if overeducated in current job, only males 
incurred a significant loss as a consequence of current overskilling. Therefore, the 
results suggest that the pay implications of skill mismatch are much lower than those 
of educational mismatch and, in the case of UK female graduates, overskilled workers 
earn a wage comparable to their matched counterparts.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
While the evidence from the wage equations suggest that skill mismatch among 
graduates is potentially much less of a policy concern relative to educational 
mismatch, some checks are necessary to ensure the reliability of these results. Some 
previous studies on overeducation have suggested that the pay penalty observed in 
OLS models is upwardly biased as a consequence of either selection bias (Dolton and 
Silles, 2002) or unobserved heterogeneity, generally attributed to lower ability levels 
of mismatched workers (Bauer, 2002, Chevalier, 2003).  To ensure the robustness of 
our estimates we adopt an approach centred on propensity score models (PSM). 
Under this approach we match individuals with like characteristics and, therefore, 
deal directly with any concerns relating to sample selection. Furthermore, within our 
estimation procedure we incorporate each individual’s history of job mismatch, so 
that the control group will consist of individuals who were mismatched in their first 
job but are now matched. Therefore, to the extent that overeducation or overskilling is 
associated with unobserved factors, these will be constant across both the control and 
treatment groups, implying that the PSM estimates will also be robust with respect to 
unobserved individual heterogeneity bias.  
                                                 
4 Green and McIntosh (2007) find a correlation between overeducation and overskilling of 0.2 
compared to 0.48 here. 
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Table 2 reports the marginal effects from the probit estimations describing 
overskilling and overeducation in current job respectively.  The models are well 
specified with the overall overskilling and overeducation models reporting pseudo R2 
statistics of 0.24 and 0.34 respectively. As expected, mismatch in first job is a strong 
predictor of mismatch in current job, especially for overeducation. On the whole, the 
relationship between current and previous mismatch appears stronger for males, 
particularly those who were overeducated in first employment suggesting higher 
levels of persistent mismatch among this grouping. With respect to the other 
covariates, a number of factors were found to influence both education and skill 
mismatch including horizontal mismatch,  a history of unemployment, age, not being 
employed in a research intensive firm and having completed a non-prestigious degree 
programme.   
 
The OLS and PSM estimates are compared in Table 3. Post estimation tests were 
carried out to ensure that the data were sufficient for the control and treatment groups 
to be balanced on all covariates. Holding constant the variables included in the stage 
one probits, the PSM estimates are comparable with those of specifications 2 and 3 in 
table 1. Given that no particular PSM methodology is generally accepted as superior, 
the Nearest Neighbour (with replacement), Radius and Kernel matching techniques 
were all used. The results of the PSM estimations align very closely with those of the 
OLS, suggesting that our original estimates were not affected by either selection or 
unobserved individual heterogeneity bias.  
 
In order to ensure robustness, further checks with respect to unobserved 
heterogeneity were achieved by carrying out a sensitivity analysis using Rosenbaum 
bounds for unobserved heterogeneity at various levels of eγ. The bounds allow us to 
assess the extent to which an unobserved variable must influence the selection process 
in order to render the matching estimates unreliable. The test again suggests that 
results are likely to be robust to such effects. For instance, at eγ = 1.7 (eγ =2) our 
overskilling (overeducation) estimate of -24.7 (-37.6) generated by the kernel 
estimation method was still reliable at a 95 per cent level of confidence. The basic 
intuition here is that even in the event of an unobserved factor increasing the 
likelihood of over-skilling by a factor of 70 per cent, or in excess of 100 per cent in 
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the case of overeducation, our estimate of a wage effect remains reliable at a 95 per 
cent confidence level5. The results seem particularly strong given that sensitivity 
analysis on the Card and Krueger (1995) minimum wage study found that results 
become unreliable between eγ values of  1.34 to 1.5 (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
 
It is clear that overeducation and overskilling, although correlated, can be considered 
as distinct events, given that the wage effects of one are not entirely incorporated by 
those of the other. To explore this matter further, we regress both the educational and 
skills mismatch variable on a measure of job satisfaction contained within the data 6. 
The rationale here is that reductions in job satisfaction will more accurately reflect the 
extent to which any particular form of mismatch is perceived as a problem for the 
individual.  The existence of wage penalties in themselves do not make the case for 
policy intervention given the possibility that individuals may choose to trade off lower 
wages for other aspects of the job, such as increased flexibility, job autonomy,  status 
etc. Previous studies have found that overeducated workers have lower levels of job 
satisfaction (Battu, Belfield and Sloane (1999), Fleming and Kler (2007). However, 
for Britain, Green and Zhu (2008) find that overqualification is not a problem for job 
satisfaction in itself if it is not accompanied by skill mismatch. Similarly, for Spain 
Badillo Amador, Nicolas and Vila (2008) also find that skill mismatches are a better 
predictor of job satisfaction than educational mismatches. 
 
The results from the REFLEX data suggest that both overeducation and 
overskilling, when included in the model independently of each other, lower 
substantially  levels of job satisfaction (Table 3 specifications 1 and 2). When 
educational mismatch controls only are included in the model, overeducation in 
current job reduces the probability of job satisfaction by 27 per cent (Specification 2). 
With respect to skills mismatch, when estimated in a model without educational 
                                                 
5 Results available from the authors. 
6 Respondents were asked to rate how satisfied they were with their current work on a scale of one to 5 
where 1 was very dissatisfied and 5 very satisfied. Graduates who responded 4 or 5 were deemed to be 
satisfied.  
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mismatch controls, overskilling in current job was found to reduce the likelihood of 
job satisfaction by 30 per cent (Specification 3). When both educational and skills 
mismatch variables were included in a model we find that only overskilling in current 
job still reduces the probability of job satisfaction by 25 per cent, while the effect of 
overeducation declines even more to 17 per cent (Specification 3). Workers who were 
underskilled in their current job enjoyed higher levels of job satisfaction, with the 
result more pronounced for females. The results from specification 4 suggest that both 
overskilling and overeducation can be considered as a policy concern as they reduce 
both wages and job satisfaction. However, while overskilling has negative 
consequences for both males and females the overeducation coefficient in the female 
regression is significant only at the 90 per cent level, casting some doubt on the extent 
to which education mismatch is considered problematic among female graduates.  
 
The observation that overeducated workers, despite suffering a more significant 
wage disadvantage relative to overskilled workers, have a higher likelihood of job 
satisfaction suggests that such workers could be engaging in some level of trade-off 
between earnings and other aspects of their job. Thus, to some extent overeducation 
may prove to be a voluntary phenomenon. However, this does not appear to be the 
case with respect to overskilling, as it is found to lower job satisfaction levels despite 
having a much smaller impact on earnings.  
 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
 
The data at hand allow us to explore the compensating differentials issue in more 
detail.  The REFLEX questionnaire asks individuals to rank the extent to which the 
following job characteristics are important to them: work autonomy, job security, 
learning, earnings, the presentation of new challenges, career prospects, allowing time 
for leisure activities, social status, societal value and allowing time for family tasks.  
Workers were then asked to assess the extent to which these job characteristics 
occurred within their current employment.  With respect to testing for compensating 
differentials, it not sufficient to examine the value that individuals place on certain job 
characteristics, given that this will not guarantee that the individual is actually 
employed in a job exhibiting such a factor. Similarly, the fact that a worker is in a job 
exhibiting various characteristics does not automatically suggest that all such factors 
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were primary drivers in the individual’s decision to take the job.  To test adequately 
for compensating differentials we must observe both that a particular job 
characteristic is of importance to the individual and that the individual is located in a 
job exhibiting such a characteristic.  Consequently, we interact both REFLEX 
variables to achieve such a measure7.  We then regress our mismatch variables on the 
various job attributes to assess the extent to which overeducated workers may be 
trading off higher earnings for other aspects of employment.  However, before 
proceeding to the econometric analysis, it is worth discussing the distribution of these 
newly created variables.  Somewhat surprisingly, only 7 per cent of respondents 
placed a high importance on and were in jobs exhibiting high earnings. The graduates 
in the sample were much more likely to value, and be employed in jobs that offered 
the opportunity to learn new skills, work autonomously, that had career prospects and 
societal value. Job security was also of high importance, particularly for females, 
while 10 per cent of workers placed a high emphasis and were employed in jobs that 
allowed a balance with family life, with this factor again proving more important for 
females (Data appendix).  
 
The results from the probit analysis are reported for all workers in tables 5a and 
5b, then separately for males (females) in tables 6a and 6b (7a and 7b).  The results 
from the pooled analysis appear intuitively sound (Tables 5a and 5b). For instance, 
males were less likely to place a high emphasis on and be in jobs that were secure or 
allowed a balanced family life, while individuals who worked more hours tended to 
be more concerned with achieving higher wages and career progression than 
balancing family or leisure commitments.  Public sector workers placed a high 
importance on and tended to be in jobs that allowed a family / leisure balance, were 
secure, had a high social status, career prospects, societal value and presented new 
challenges. Individuals employed in high-tech / R&D intensive establishments were 
more likely to place the emphasis on and be employed in jobs that involved learning, 
that were career progressive and presented new challenges. With respect to the 
mismatch variables the results confirm that overeducated workers place a high 
                                                 
7 In both questions respondents are asked to provide a response on a one to five scale where 1 was not 
at all important (does not apply at all) and 5 very important (applies to a very high extent).  The binary 
variables were based on a response of 5 and the dependent variables in our models were derived from 
the interaction of these two binary controls.  
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importance on and are more likely to be employed in jobs that offer security, 
suggesting that this may be the source of the trade-off explaining average job 
satisfaction in the face of lower earnings. With respect to overskilling, there was 
nothing to suggest that such workers were trading off lower pay for other job 
attributes, the only significant result relating to a lower likelihood of opting for jobs 
because they presented new challenges. It is worth pointing out that neither the 
opportunity to learn new skills or improve career prospects were important for 
mismatched workers, adding further weight to the evidence rejecting explanations of 
mismatch centred around theories of career advancement (McGuinness and Wooden, 
2009). Proponents of the occupational mobility based hypothesis (Rosen 1972; 
Sicherman and Galor 1990) predict that workers may deliberately enter their preferred 
profession at a level lower in order to acquire the necessary skills, through on-the-job 
training and learning, that will enable them to achieve more rapid career progression 
in the future. Clearly, the evidence presented here refutes this, as none of the controls 
relating to learning or career progression were significant for either overeducation or 
overskilling. 
 
Some significant differences were apparent when the models were re-estimated 
according to gender.  Overeducated males were found to be more likely to opt for jobs 
that allow a balance with family life and they tend to place a lower emphasis on high 
earnings, demonstrating clear evidence of a compensating wage effect.  Overskilled 
males were found to less likely to place a high importance on and be employed in jobs 
that had a societal value or were career progressing (Tables 6a and 6b). With respect 
to overeducated females, job security was found to be a key motivating factor 
underlying job choice. The absence of a significant family balance effect among 
females is somewhat surprising; however, this may be facilitated primarily through 
the increased likelihood of public sector employment which tends to be more flexible 
with respect to achieving a work / life balance.  No significant effects were found with 
respect to overskilled females (Tables 7a and 7b). 
 
 
< Insert Table 5a > 
 
< Insert Table 5b > 
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< Insert Table 6a here > 
 
< Insert Table 6b here> 
 
< Insert Table 7a here> 
 
< Insert Table 7b here> 
 
Finally we attempt to establish the specific skill competencies that, when 
constrained, lead to lower wages in the case of male graduates and lower levels of job 
satisfaction for all graduates.  The REFLEX questionnaire asks respondents to rank 
their ability levels in 19 competency areas8 on a seven point scale and subsequently to 
assess the extent to which the competency is required in their current post using a 
similar rating system. Respondents were also asked to identify their three strongest 
areas of competency from the list. We define an individual as overskilled in a 
particular area if the competency is identified as a strong point and the level of skill 
required in the job is two or more rating scores below the level of acquired skill.  We 
re-estimate the job satisfaction and wage equations with these additional variables in 
order to assess the sensitivity of the overall penalties to the inclusion of the individual 
mismatch controls. 
 
The re-estimated job satisfaction model is shown in table 8. With respect to the 
individual overskilling controls in specification 2, the results indicate that overall job 
satisfaction is lower where graduates are unable to utilise all their field specific 
knowledge and engage in analytical thinking. However, workers with surplus 
computer related skills are found to have higher levels of job satisfaction, suggesting 
that some value is placed on an ability to keep pace with technical progress in a work 
context. When the general overskilling and overeducation controls are re-introduced 
                                                 
8 The competency fields are (1) mastery of own discipline (2) knowledge of other disciplines (3) 
analytical thinking (4) ability to acquire new knowledge  (5) ability to negotiate (6) ability to perform 
under pressure (7) alertness to new opportunities (8) ability to coordinate activities  (9) ability to use 
time effectively  (10) ability to work productively with others (11) ability to mobilise the capabilities of 
others (12) ability to make your meaning clear to others (13) ability to assert your authority (14) ability 
to use computers and the internet (15) ability to come up with new ideas and solutions (16) willingness 
to question your own ideas and others (17) ability to present products and ideas (18) ability to write 
reports etc.  (19) ability to write and speak in a foreign language.  
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into the model, the general job satisfaction penalty of 23 per cent remains unchanged, 
suggesting that the individual overskilling variables are not effectively identifying the 
causes of lower job satisfaction. However, the situation alters somewhat when the 
sample is again split according to gender.  The positive return to surplus computer 
skills appears to be specific to males; furthermore there is evidence of a positive 
return to surplus language skills among males and, as a consequence of these two 
effects, the overall overskilling penalty for male graduates actually increases from 25 
to 30 per cent when the competency specific controls are included. This suggests that 
lower male job satisfaction relates either to (a) factors not included in the competency 
list relating, presumably, to general ability, or (b) the lower wage penalty associated 
with overskilling.  The situation for females is somewhat different, with a negative 
impact of under used language and field specific competencies reducing the 
overskilling job satisfaction penalty by approximately 15 per cent.  The lack of a 
negative wage effect suggests that the remainder of the negative female overskilling 
effect is related to under-utilisation in other unobserved competencies and / or general 
ability. 
 
< Insert Table 8 here > 
 
< Insert Table 9 here > 
 
The re-estimated male wage equation is presented in table 8. There are negative 
wage effects associated with an inability to use field specific skills and the ability to 
question ideas. However, when these individual effects are included in the model the 
overskilling pay penalty falls only marginally. Interestingly, the overeducation pay 
penalty declines by 20 per cent, demonstrating the importance of these skills in the 
context of explaining the effects of educational mismatch.  Given the comprehensive 
nature of the controls used in this study, the results suggest that the productivity 
constraint placed on male graduates and the lower job satisfaction levels experienced 
by all graduates as a consequence of overskilling are likely to relate to an inability to 
utilise general intellect as opposed to any specific set of skills. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
There has been a substantial increase in the number of graduates emerging from 
Higher Education Institutions in the UK and this has raised questions about the ability 
of the labour market to absorb them. As data based on subjective responses from 
employed graduates suggest not only that a substantial proportion of graduates are in 
jobs for which a degree is not required, but also that this proportion has been 
increasing over time some have expressed concern that the UK may be producing too 
many graduates. Care must be taken, however, in interpreting these results and our 
data set, REFLEX enables us not only to distinguish between over-(and under-) 
education and over-(and under-) skilling, and analyse their effects on both earnings 
and job satisfaction, but also to consider whether some graduates may have chosen 
certain jobs which are “non-graduate” because they offer compensating advantages 
which offset their lower pay. 
 
We find there are large wage penalties for being in a job for which one is currently 
overeducated and a substantial, but smaller, wage penalty for being overskilled. 
However, only males suffer a significant wage loss as a consequence of current 
overskilling. These results remain after using a propensity score matching model to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. Further, when both educational and skills 
mismatch variables are included in a job satisfaction question it is overskilling which 
has the stronger negative effect on job satisfaction, with the overeducation variable 
being significant only at the 90% for women. This is suggestive of the presence of a 
trade-off between earnings and other aspects of employment. Further light is cast on 
this by utilising a series of questions on job characteristics within the REFLEX data 
set. We have information both on whether a particular job characteristic is present 
and, if so, what value the individual employee places on it. Thus, overeducated 
workers are more likely to be in jobs that offer greater security, which they also tend 
to value highly, whereas no such factors are present for overskilled workers. Further, 
over-educated men are more likely to opt for, and value highly, jobs which offered a 
greater balance with family life and this group also placed a lower emphasis on high 
earnings. Thus, the balance of evidence points to a trade-off between being employed 
in jobs with graduate level requirements or selecting those with compensating job 
attributes. As no such trade-off is found for skill mismatching it is on overskilling that 
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the policy focus should centre as this represents welfare losses both to the individual 
and the economy as a whole. 
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Table 1: Wage equations with overeducation, undereducation, overskilling and 
underskilling controls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Males Females 
       
Male 0.09** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** - - 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) - - 
Labexp 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.15** -0.13** -0.15** -0.14** -0.04 -0.17** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.08) 
Human 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.14 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) 
Social 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.09) 
Science -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 0.10 -0.51** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.21) 
Agvet -0.23* -0.20* -0.22* -0.20* -0.05 -0.33 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.20) 
Health 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.02 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) 
Mast 0.13** 0.10 0.13** 0.10 0.11 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
First 0.14** 0.12** 0.15** 0.13** 0.23*** 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Twoone 0.08** 0.06* 0.08** 0.06* 0.10** 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Unemp -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.08* -0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Supervise 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.05 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
fieldmatchnow 0.11** 0.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
fieldrelatednow 0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
fieldmatchjob1 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.00 -0.12 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
fieldrelatedjob1 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.15** 0.08 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Coursemp 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
courseprest 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.08* 0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
coursevoc 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Hours 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rdfirm 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
size5099 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
size100249 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
size250999 0.09* 0.10** 0.09* 0.10* 0.06 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
size1000 0.10** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.22*** 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
Public -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.18*** -0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
numemployers -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
overednow  -0.39***  -0.34*** -0.31*** -0.37*** 
  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
underednow  -0.05  -0.05 -0.05 -0.11 
  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
Overedjob1  -0.05  -0.07 -0.11* -0.05 
  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
underedjob1  0.03  0.03 0.13 -0.12 
  (0.09)  (0.09) (0.11) (0.15) 
overskillnow   -0.22*** -0.10* -0.15** -0.01 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
underskillnow   0.09*** 0.08** 0.06 0.08 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
overskilljob1   0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.10* 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
underskilljob1   0.02 0.00 -0.07 0.10* 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 6.44*** 6.56*** 6.48*** 6.55*** 6.37*** 6.68*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.23) (0.20) 
       
Observations 1023 1023 1023 1023 392 631 
R-squared 0.27 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.50 0.29 
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Table 2: Marginal effects from probits - Propensity Score Models 
 
  Overskillin
g 
  Overeducatio
n 
 
VARIABLES All Males Females All Males Females 
       
overskilljob1 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.08** -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
underskilljob1 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
overedjob1 -0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
underedjob1 -0.06* -0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.09 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.17) 
male 0.04**   0.02   
 (0.02)   (0.02)   
labexp -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.00* 0.01** -0.00 0.00** 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) 
human 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
social 0.03 -0.00 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) 
science 0.03 -0.02 0.30 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.29) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) 
agvet 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.02 0.52* 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.00) (0.11) (0.09) (0.28) 
health -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
mast 0.04 -0.00 0.07 0.02 0.13 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) 
first 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
twoone -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
numemployers -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
unemp 0.05** 0.05 0.05** 0.04* 0.03 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
supervise -0.04** -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
fieldmatchnow -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
fieldrelatednow -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
hours 0.00 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00* -0.00 
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp 0.03 0.11** -0.02 0.04 0.09** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
courseprest -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.11*** -0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
coursevoc -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
rdfirm -0.03** -0.04 -0.03 -0.03** -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
size5099 -0.03 -0.09** 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
size100249 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06** 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
size250999 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) 
size1000 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
public -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Observations 1056 406 583 994 371 597 
Pseudo R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.34 0.38 0.36 
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Table 3: OLS & Propensity Score Model Estimates of Overskilling Wage Effect 
 
   
 Overskiling Overeducation 
OLS -0.22*** -0.39*** 
N Neighbour -0.26*** -0.40*** 
Radius -0.25*** -0.40*** 
Kernal -0.25*** -0.37*** 
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Table 4: Probit estimates of Job Satisfaction with overeducation & overskilling 
controls 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All All All All Males Females 
       
male -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01   
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)   
labexp 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.08) 
human -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08) 
social 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.09) 
science -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.00 -0.29 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.23) 
agvet -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.02 -0.23 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.22) 
health -0.19* -0.20** -0.19* -0.19* -0.22 -0.19* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.22) (0.11) 
mast -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) 
first -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) 
twoone -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
unemp -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
supervise 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
fieldmatchnow 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
fieldrelatednow 0.11*** 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) 
fieldmatchjob1 -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.28** -0.22** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) 
fieldrelatedjob1 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
hours -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
courseprest 0.08*** 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.04 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
coursevoc 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.04 
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 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
rdfirm 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
size5099 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.12 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) 
size100249 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) 
size250999 -0.11** -0.10* -0.11* -0.10* 0.03 -0.16** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) 
size1000 -0.08* -0.07 -0.07* -0.07 0.05 -0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
public 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.11* 0.10** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
numemployers -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
overednow  -0.27***  -0.17*** -0.24** -0.14* 
  (0.05)  (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
overedjob1  -0.01  0.03 0.02 0.03 
  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
underednow  -0.03  -0.05 -0.12 0.01 
  (0.07)  (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) 
underedjob1  -0.06  -0.06 -0.11 0.01 
  (0.10)  (0.10) (0.15) (0.14) 
overskillnow   -0.30*** -0.25*** -0.31*** -0.20** 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
overskilljob1   -0.10** -0.10** -0.12* -0.10 
   (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
underskillnow   0.12*** 0.11*** 0.14** 0.08* 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
underskilljob1   -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
Observations 1056 1056 1056 1056 406 650 
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25
 
Table 5a: Job Characteristic Probits – All  workers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Family Security Earnings Learning Status 
      
male -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
labexp -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) 
human 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
social -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
science -0.06*** 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.05 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
agvet 0.06 -0.07  -0.13*  
 (0.08) (0.09)  (0.07)  
health -0.02 0.04  0.03 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.03) 
mast 0.02 -0.11** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.02** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
first 0.04 -0.08* -0.00 0.01 -0.03*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) 
twoone 0.00 -0.07** -0.02 -0.07** -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
unemp -0.00 -0.06* -0.01 -0.04 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
supervise -0.03* 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
fieldmatchnow 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.08* 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
fieldrelatednow 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
hours -0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp 0.02 -0.02 0.03* -0.00 0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
courseprest 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
coursevoc 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
rdfirm -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.08*** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
size5099 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
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size100249 -0.03 0.02 -0.03* -0.04 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
size250999 -0.05*** -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
size1000 -0.05*** -0.07** -0.01 -0.05 -0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
public 0.04*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.07** 0.04*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
numemployers 0.00** -0.03*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
overskillnow -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07* -0.03*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
overednow 0.05 0.11** -0.02 -0.06 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
      
Observations 
Pseudo R-squared 
1056 
0.13 
1056 
0.10 
972 
0.12 
1056 
0.06 
1034 
0.13 
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Table 5b: Job Characteristic Probits – All Workers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Useful Leisure Career Autonom Chall 
      
male -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
labexp -0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education -0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
human -0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
social -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
science -0.05 0.02 -0.00 -0.08 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) 
agvet -0.12*** -0.02 -0.08 -0.03  
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08)  
health -0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
mast -0.00 -0.05 -0.07** 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
first 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
twoone 0.03 -0.02 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
unemp -0.00 0.03 -0.04* 0.00 -0.05* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
supervise 0.02 -0.04* 0.01 0.04* 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
fieldmatchnow -0.01 0.04 0.08** -0.00 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
fieldrelatednow -0.07** 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
hours -0.00 -0.00** 0.00* -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp -0.06** -0.01 0.06** 0.06** 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
courseprest 0.04* 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
coursevoc -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
rdfirm 0.01 -0.01 0.04* 0.03 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
size5099 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
  28
size100249 -0.01 0.10* -0.03 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
size250999 -0.06** -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
size1000 -0.11*** 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
public 0.21*** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.03 0.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
numemployers 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
overskillnow -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
overednow 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Observations 
Pseudo R-squared 
1056 
0.15 
1056 
0.04 
1056 
0.07 
1056 
0.05 
1034 
0.07 
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Table 6a: Job Characteristic Probits - Males 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Family Security Earnings Learning Status 
      
labexp 0.00 0.00** 0.00** -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education 0.00 0.29 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.19) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) 
human -0.01 0.12 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.14) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) 
social -0.00 0.10 -0.01 -0.14 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.15) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) 
science  0.14 -0.00 -0.08 0.02 
  (0.17) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) 
agvet 0.04 0.00  -0.08  
 (0.08) (0.15)  (0.10)  
health  -0.09  0.11  
  (0.09)  (0.19)  
mast -0.00 -0.13*** -0.02* -0.05 -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
first 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
twoone -0.00 -0.09** -0.02 -0.07 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
unemp -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
supervise -0.01 0.07* 0.01 -0.00 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
fieldmatchnow 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.18** 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
fieldrelatednow 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.10* 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) 
hours -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
courseprest 0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
coursevoc -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
rdfirm 0.01 -0.08** 0.00 0.11*** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
size5099 -0.00 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.22* 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) 
size100249 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.11 
  30
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.09) (0.11) 
size250999 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.12 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) 
size1000 -0.04* -0.06 0.01 -0.00 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) 
public 0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.07** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
numemployers -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
overskillnow -0.01 -0.07 -0.00 -0.09* -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
overednow 0.11* -0.01 -0.02* 0.01 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) 
      
Observations 
Pseudo R-squared 
333 
0.35 
406 
0.12 
375 
0.23 
406 
0.09 
375 
0.19 
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Table 6b: Job Characteristic Probits Males 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Useful Leisure Career Autonomy Challeng 
      
labexp -0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education 0.12 -0.02 0.21 -0.08 -0.11** 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.21) (0.06) (0.05) 
human 0.05 -0.09 0.27 -0.07 -0.10 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) 
social 0.07 -0.07 0.15 -0.10 -0.11* 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.18) (0.06) (0.06) 
science 0.10 -0.05 0.18 -0.12*** -0.09* 
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.21) (0.04) (0.05) 
agvet 0.04 -0.03 0.11 -0.04  
 (0.15) (0.09) (0.23) (0.08)  
health 0.34 -0.11*** 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.25) (0.03) (0.21) (0.10) (0.10) 
mast -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
first -0.06** 0.02 -0.10** 0.18* 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07) 
twoone 0.01 0.02 -0.10*** 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
unemp -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
supervise 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.08** 0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
fieldmatchnow -0.05 0.08 0.14* 0.02 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
fieldrelatednow -0.03 0.05 0.09 0.05 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
hours -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06* 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
courseprest 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
coursevoc -0.07*** -0.02 0.01 0.10** -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
rdfirm 0.01 0.06* 0.03 0.03 0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
size5099 0.07 -0.02 0.15 0.05 0.16 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
size100249 0.01 0.16 0.11 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
  32
size250999 -0.08*** -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
size1000 -0.12*** 0.07* -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
public 0.18*** 0.09** 0.01 0.03 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
numemployers 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
overskillnow -0.08*** -0.03 -0.08* 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
overednow 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
      
Observations 
Pseudo R-squared 
406 
0.22 
406 
0.10 
406 
0.12 
406 
0.10 
391 
0.11 
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Table 7a: Job Characteristic Probits – Females 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Family Security Earnings Learning Status 
      
labexp -0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) 
human 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
social -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) 
science -0.08** -0.12 0.08 0.23  
 (0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23)  
agvet  -0.05    
  (0.17)    
health -0.01 0.10  0.03 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.05) 
mast 0.06 -0.08  0.07 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.02) 
first 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.09 -0.03*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) 
twoone 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
unemp 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
supervise -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
fieldmatchnow -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) 
fieldrelatednow 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
hours -0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.01** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp 0.06* -0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
courseprest 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
coursevoc 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
rdfirm -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.09** -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
size5099 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
size100249 -0.03 0.06 -0.03** -0.09 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
size250999 -0.07*** -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03** 
  34
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.01) 
size1000 -0.05* -0.09** -0.03 -0.09** -0.05*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
public 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
numemployers 0.01* -0.03** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
overskillnow 0.04 0.02 -0.00 -0.06  
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)  
overednow 0.01 0.17** -0.02 -0.09 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
      
Observations 
Pseudo R-squared 
637 
0.12 
644 
0.11 
549 
0.16 
637 
0.10 
556 
0.19 
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Table 7b: Job Characteristic Probits Females 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Useful Leisure Career Autonom Challengin 
      
labexp -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education -0.05 0.05 -0.00 -0.04 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
human -0.06 0.11 -0.00 0.00 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
social -0.09 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
science -0.06   0.04 0.19 
 (0.15)   (0.17) (0.23) 
health -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) 
mast 0.02 -0.03 -0.08** -0.01 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
first 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
twoone 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
unemp 0.02 0.05 -0.08*** -0.01 -0.07** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
supervise 0.00 -0.07** -0.02 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
fieldmatchnow 0.01 0.01 0.08* -0.01 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
fieldrelatednow -0.09** -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
hours -0.00 -0.00* 0.00** 0.00 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp -0.06 0.00 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
courseprest 0.07* 0.02 0.01 -0.05* 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
coursevoc 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
rdfirm 0.02 -0.06* 0.04 0.02 0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
size5099 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
size100249 -0.00 0.08 -0.07** 0.04 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
size250999 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
size1000 -0.10** 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 
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 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
public 0.23*** 0.04 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
numemployers -0.00 0.00 0.02* 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
overskillnow 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.13* 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
overednow -0.01 0.02 -0.07* -0.08* -0.13*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
      
Observations 
Pseudo R-squared 
637 
0.13 
630 
0.06 
630 
0.12 
637 
0.07 
637 
0.08 
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Table 8: Job Satisfaction equation with competency based overskilling controls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Males Females 
      
male 0.07* 0.06* 0.08**   
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)   
labexp -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
education 0.10 0.10 0.12* 0.18 0.09 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) 
human 0.12* 0.12* 0.14** 0.13 0.12 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) 
social 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.09) 
science 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.35*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.10) 
agvet 0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21) 
health 0.16** 0.17** 0.17** -0.17 0.26*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) 
mast 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) 
first 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) 
twoone 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
unemp 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.08* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
supervise -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
fieldmatchnow -0.09 -0.04 -0.11* -0.10 -0.11 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) 
fieldrelatednow 0.07* 0.12*** 0.06 0.14* 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
fieldmatchjob1 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) 
fieldrelatedjob1 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) 
hours 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01*** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
courseprest -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.09 -0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
coursevoc 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
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rdfirm -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
size5099 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) 
size100249 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) 
size250999 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.16* -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
size1000 0.07* 0.06 0.07* 0.15** 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
public -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* 0.01 -0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) 
numemployers 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
osownf  -0.18* -0.14 -0.09 -0.32* 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17) 
osothf  0.19 0.22 0.26  
  (0.19) (0.18) (0.16)  
osanal  -0.17* -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) 
osackn  -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.21) (0.15) 
osnegot  0.23 0.27  0.15 
  (0.22) (0.19)  (0.36) 
ospress  0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.05 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.21) 
osalert  0.08 0.05 0.16 -0.06 
  (0.20) (0.21) (0.25) (0.41) 
oscoord  0.06 0.02 -0.32 0.13 
  (0.17) (0.18) (0.43) (0.20) 
ostime  -0.13 -0.12 0.01 -0.06 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0.22) 
oswoth  -0.22 -0.26* -0.25 -0.25 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0.23) 
oscmean  -0.24 -0.20 -0.15 -0.30 
  (0.22) (0.23) (0.41) (0.29) 
oscompu  0.16* 0.18** 0.30*** 0.14 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) 
ossolut  -0.14 -0.16 0.04 -0.24 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.31) (0.20) 
osquest  0.10 0.13 0.16 0.14 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) 
ospres  -0.12 -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.22) (0.15) 
oswrite  -0.06 -0.05 0.02 -0.11 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.19) (0.16) 
oslang  -0.07 -0.09 0.27* -0.24** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) 
overskillnow -0.23***  -0.23*** -0.30*** -0.20** 
 (0.05)  (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) 
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underskillnow -0.01  -0.01 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
overskilljob1 0.07*  0.07 -0.03 0.14** 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
underskilljob1 -0.05  -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.04)  (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
overednow -0.07  -0.07 -0.13 -0.06 
 (0.06)  (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) 
overedjob1 -0.04  -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.05)  (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
underednow -0.03  -0.02 0.02 -0.08 
 (0.07)  (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) 
underedjob1 -0.13  -0.14 -0.21 -0.05 
 (0.10)  (0.10) (0.15) (0.16) 
      
Observations 1056 1050 1050 402 641 
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Table 9: Male wage equations with competency based overskilling controls 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
male 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
labexp 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
age 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
human 0.14 0.08 0.14 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
social 0.14 0.06 0.12 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
science 0.10 0.05 0.07 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
agvet -0.05 -0.11 -0.05 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
health 0.18 0.20 0.19 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
mast 0.11 0.16* 0.13 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
first 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.22** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
twoone 0.10** 0.12** 0.10** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
unemp -0.08* -0.12** -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
supervise 0.05 0.07 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
fieldmatchnow -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
fieldrelatednow 0.01 0.11* 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
fieldmatchjob1 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
fieldrelatedjob1 -0.15** -0.14** -0.16** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
hours 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
coursemp -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
courseprest 0.08* 0.13*** 0.09* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
coursevoc 0.00 0.04 0.00 
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 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
rdfirm -0.03 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
size5099 0.05 0.00 0.04 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
size100249 0.07 0.03 0.05 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
size250999 0.06 0.06 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
size1000 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
public -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.19*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
numemployers 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
osownf  -0.27** -0.16 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
osothf  -0.16 -0.01 
  (0.21) (0.20) 
osanal  -0.07 -0.06 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
osackn  -0.12 -0.01 
  (0.16) (0.15) 
osnegot  -0.15 -0.08 
  (0.72) (0.69) 
ospress  -0.04 0.02 
  (0.17) (0.16) 
osalert  0.32 0.21 
  (0.26) (0.25) 
oscoord  -0.32 -0.17 
  (0.30) (0.29) 
ostime  -0.13 -0.06 
  (0.17) (0.17) 
oswoth  -0.21 -0.10 
  (0.18) (0.17) 
osmob  -0.59 -0.36 
  (0.55) (0.53) 
oscmean  0.00 -0.06 
  (0.31) (0.29) 
osauth  -0.24 0.06 
  (0.33) (0.32) 
oscompu  0.12 0.21 
  (0.15) (0.14) 
ossolut  0.03 0.03 
  (0.25) (0.24) 
osquest  -0.31** -0.27** 
  (0.14) (0.14) 
ospres  0.06 0.08 
  (0.16) (0.15) 
oswrite  -0.17 -0.13 
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  (0.17) (0.16) 
oslang  0.17 0.12 
  (0.17) (0.16) 
overskillnow -0.15**  -0.14** 
 (0.06)  (0.07) 
underskillnow 0.06  0.07 
 (0.05)  (0.05) 
overskilljob1 -0.05  -0.03 
 (0.06)  (0.06) 
underskilljob1 -0.07  -0.09 
 (0.06)  (0.06) 
overednow -0.31***  -0.25*** 
 (0.07)  (0.08) 
overedjob1 -0.11*  -0.12* 
 (0.06)  (0.06) 
underednow -0.05  -0.02 
 (0.09)  (0.09) 
underedjob1 0.13  0.13 
 (0.11)  (0.11) 
Constant 6.37*** 6.40*** 6.37*** 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) 
    
Observations 392 392 392 
R-squared 0.50 0.46 0.51 
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APPENDIX 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 All Employees Males  Females  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
       
wage 2659.85 1350.15 2899.85 1398.41 2509.69 1302.71 
overednow 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.33 
underednow 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.21 
overedjob1 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 
underedjob1 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.14 
       
overskillnow 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.12 0.32 
underskill~w 0.26 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 
overskillj~1 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 
underskill~1 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.18 0.39 
       
male 0.38 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
labexp 50.83 12.60 50.42 12.89 51.08 12.44 
age 29.15 6.09 29.15 6.17 29.17 6.07 
education 0.26 0.44 0.16 0.37 0.33 0.47 
human 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 
social 0.19 0.39 0.25 0.43 0.15 0.36 
science 0.06 0.24 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.10 
agvet 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.11 
health 0.06 0.25 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.26 
       
mast 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.25 
first 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 
twoone 0.49 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.50 
unemp 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.48 
supervise 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.50 
fieldmatch~w 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 
fieldrelat~w 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 
fieldmatch~1 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 
fieldrelat~1 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.31 0.46 
coursemp 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.44 
courseprest 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.50 
coursevoc 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44 
       
hours 37.53 7.91 38.84 8.38 36.75 7.53 
rdfirm 0.43 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.49 
size5099 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 
size100249 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 
size250999 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36 
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size1000 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.49 
public 0.47 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.54 0.50 
numemployers 2.62 2.94 2.56 2.18 2.65 3.34 
       
familynew 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.12 0.32 
securenew 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.30 0.46 
earnnew 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 
learnnew 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 
statusnew 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 
usefulnew 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.35 0.23 0.42 
leisnew 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.38 
careernew 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 
autonnew 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 
challnew 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45
Data Appendix 
 
Lwage Gross monthly earnings in main employment logged.  
Overednow: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overeducated in current job and 
zero otherwise 
Underednow: Dummy variable takes value 1 if undereducated in current job and 
zero otherwise  
Overedjob1: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overeducated in first job and zero 
otherwise 
Underedjob1: Dummy variable takes value 1 if undereducated in first job and 
zero otherwise  
Overskillnow: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in current job and zero 
otherwise 
Underskillnow: Dummy variable takes value 1 if underskilled in current job and 
zero otherwise  
Overskilljob1: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in first job and zero 
otherwise 
Underskilljob1: Dummy variable takes value 1 if underskilled in first job and zero 
otherwise  
Male: Dummy variable takes value 1 if Male and zero otherwise 
Labex Number of months employed since graduation  
age: Age in years 
Education: Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Education 
and zero otherwise 
Human: Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was 
Humanities and zero otherwise 
Social: Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Social 
Science and zero otherwise 
Science: Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Science 
and zero otherwise 
Agvet: Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was 
Agriculture / Veterinary and zero otherwise 
Health: Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Education 
and zero otherwise 
Mast: Dummy variable takes value 1 if possessed a Masters degree and 
zero otherwise 
First: Dummy variable takes value 1 if possessed a First Class degree and 
zero otherwise 
Twoone: Dummy variable takes value 1 if possessed an Upper Second 
degree and zero otherwise 
Supervise: Dummy variable takes value 1 if supervised staff members and 
zero otherwise 
Fieldmatchnow: Dummy variable takes value 1 if current job matched exclusively 
to field of study and zero otherwise 
Fieldrelatednow: Dummy variable takes value 1 if current job matched on own or a 
related field of study and zero otherwise 
Fieldmatchjob1: Dummy variable takes value 1 if first job matched exclusively to 
field of study and zero otherwise 
Fieldrelatedjob1: Dummy variable takes value 1 if first job matched on own or a 
related field of study and zero otherwise 
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Coursemp: Dummy variable takes value 1 if employers were familiar with 
course and zero otherwise 
Courseprest: Dummy variable takes value 1 if course was academically 
prestigious and zero otherwise 
Coursevoc: Dummy variable takes value 1 if course was vocationally and zero 
otherwise 
Hours: Regular contract hours per week 
RDfirm: Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a research intensive 
firm and zero otherwise 
Size5099: Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 50 to 99 
workers and zero otherwise 
Size100249: Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 100 to 
249 workers and zero otherwise 
Size250999: Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 250 to 
999 workers and zero otherwise 
Size1000: Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with over 
1000 workers and zero otherwise 
Size1000: Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a public sector 
organisation and zero otherwise 
Numemployers: Number of employers since graduation 
Familynew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on family work / balance 
and employed in a job with high level of work / family balance 
Securenew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on job security and 
employed in a job with high level of job security 
Earnnew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on high earnings and 
employed in a job with high level of high earnings 
Learnnew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on learning and employed 
in a job with high level of learning 
Statusnew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on social status and 
employed in a job with high level of social status 
Usefulnew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on societal value and 
employed in a job with high level of societal value 
Leisnew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on work / leisure balance 
and employed in a job with high level of work / leisure balance 
Careernew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on career prospects and 
employed in a job with high level of career prospects 
Autonew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on autonomy and employed 
in a job with high level of autonomy 
Challnew Dummy variable if puts high emphasis on new challenges and 
employed in a job with high level of new challenges 
Osownf: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in own field and zero 
otherwise 
Osothf: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in another field and 
zero otherwise 
Osanal: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in analytical thinking 
and zero otherwise 
Osack: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to acquire 
new knowledge and zero  
Osonegot: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to negotiate 
effectively  and zero otherwise 
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Ospress: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to perform 
well under pressure and zero otherwise 
Osalert: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in alertness to new 
opportunities and zero otherwise 
Oscoord: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to coordinate 
activities and zero otherwise 
Ostime: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to use time 
effectively and zero otherwise 
Oswoth: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to work 
productively with others and zero otherwise 
Osmob: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to mobilize 
the capabilities of thers and zero otherwise 
Oscmean: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to make 
your meaning clear to others and zero otherwise 
Osauth: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to assert 
your authority and zero otherwise 
Oscompu: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to use 
computers and zero otherwise 
Ossolut: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to come up 
with new ideas and solutions and zero otherwise 
Osquest: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to question 
yours and others ideas and zero otherwise 
Ospres: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to present 
ideas / products to others and zero otherwise 
Oswrite: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to write 
reports memos or documents and zero otherwise 
Oslang: Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in ability to write and 
speak in a foreign language and zero otherwise 
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